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The European Union (EU) enlargement, which reinforces peace, democracy 
and stability in Europe, has been a central foreign policy tool for the promotion of 
the domestic reforms required in candidate countries. However, the EU’s intervention 
has been far from effective in the post-war context of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which 
conflict ended after three-and-a-half years with the signature of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement (DPA) in December 1995. The Agreement was considered one of the most 
ambitious peace-building projects, defining in most of its annexes the political project 
of state building and societal reconstruction of Bosnia. The goal was thus ending war 
and setting the framework to create a viable and self-sustained state. The mission 
was coordinated by the Office of the High Representative, set as the ad hoc body 
responsible for supervising and coordinating the civil aspects of the DPA. Empowered 
in 1997 in order to push for the implementation of the peace agreement and assuring 
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its compliance, the High Representative’s powers were gradually replaced by the pull 
of European Institutions. The European path of Bosnia and Herzegovina reached its 
climax with the signature of the Stabilization and Association Agreement in 2008. 
Dealing with the challenges of the state-building and peace-building processes in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the aim of this paper is to analyse the limited progresses of 
Bosnia in the complex advance towards the European accession despite the lingered 
international intervention. The paper is structured in two sections. The first one 
analyses the evolution of the international intervention in the country. The second 
section focuses on the long process of ratifying the Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement, which have been compromising the European path of Bosnia.
1 Introduction
The power of attraction of European Union (EU) membership has been 
hailed as one of the most powerful tools of EU foreign policy. Enlargement, seen 
as reinforcing peace, democracy and stability in Europe, serves as a key driver for 
political and economic reform in candidate countries (JuncoS 2012). however, the 
process of enlargement is very demanding in Western Balkans because of the legacy 
of war. This is especially evident in the case of Bosnia and herzegovina where despite 
the massive international intervention during the post-war period, limited success has 
been achieved in the construction of a functional state and the implementation of the 
Dayton Peace Agreement. Despite the evolution of reforms has been uneven along the 
post-war period, since the pull of the European integration in mid-2000s the political 
situation has become increasingly complex, halting the long journey towards the 
European integration since 2008.
in Bosnia, the integration within the European Union could become a particularly 
effective tool to advance in the necessary reforms to make a functional state while 
overcoming the divisive agenda in the country among the elites of the three constitutive 
ethno-national groups; these are the Bosnian muslims or Bosniaks, Bosnian croats and 
Bosnian serbs. Despite having signed the stabilisation and Association Agreement 
(sAA) in 2008, it has not been put into force for almost seven years since preconditions 
set by Brussels were not continuously met due to the incapability to reach consensus 
among political parties.
structured in two sections, this paper focuses on the complexity of the European 
path of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The first section analyses the evolution of the 
international intervention in relation to the implementation of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement. it shows that the challenges in the country emerged since the beginning 
of the implementation of peace accords and have been hardly overcome despite the 
empowerment of the high Representative (hR). in the second section the focus is on 
the long path towards the signature of the sAA. The goal of this second section is two-
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fold, highlighting both the political regression experienced in the country since the 
first serious attempt to reform the constitution in 2006 and the internal contradictions 
of the EU’s enlargement process while being implemented in the post-war context of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the end, the progress to unblock the ratification of the 
sAA is presented.
2 the evolution of the international intervention in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina
The Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed after three weeks of negotiations. 
it was not a conventional peace agreement since ten out of twelve annexes were not 
military. Despite not having the same concretion that the two military annexes, the 
civilian ones set the framework to rebuild the country both socially and economically 
after three and a half years of war. in these annexes, the constitution of Bosnia and 
herzegovina was included and also the territorial division in two autonomous entities, 
the federation of Bosnia and herzegovina [federacija Bosne i hercegovine, fBih] and 
the Republika srpska (Rs), or the right of refugees and internally Displaced Persons 
(iDP’s) to return to pre-war homes.
in its annex 10, the DPA set the high Representative (hR) as the responsible 
to monitor the implementation of the peace settlement. The Office of the High 
Representative became thus the ad-hoc body responsible for supervising and 
coordinating the civilian aspects of the DPA. Yet, the peace building had to advance 
in a parallel way to the state-building process. in this sense, according to the accords, 
peace would be achieved once Bosnian statehood was consolidated and a minimum of 
consensus was achieved among all ethnic communities regarding the legitimacy of the 
Bosnian state (donaiS 2005). in practice, the state-building process that should create 
a functioning state through the development of joint institutions was challenged from 
the very beginning.
The politics of ethnic conflict in Bosnia continued during most of the post-war 
period in part due to the fact that the three ethno-national parties that fought the war 
kept controlling the political arena. it had a negative impact on the adoption of reforms 
promoted by the international community, which aimed at creating a market democracy. 
in this sense, the reforms promoted by international actors in the framework of the DPA 
weakened the very foundation of the power achieved by ethno-national parties during 
the war, with ethnic territorialisation as one of the main practices. in other words, both 
the development of the state institutions and the implementation of some of the annexes 
of the DPA undermined the ethno-national power that had been legitimised with the 
division of Bosnia in two entities. The communist legacy and the power structures 
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configured during the war provided these parties with the means of obstructing most 
international initiatives, having the fundamental interest in preventing structural 
reform of public institutions and the economy (Esi 1999). This resistance posed by 
local actors caused that the international civilian mission significantly evolved over 
time. In order to frame the difficulties of the path into the European integration, three 
distinct periods of international intervention are firstly analysed.
The first period was dominated by the prevalence of the military provisions of 
the DPA with a limited authority of the hR. if the DPA implied both military and 
civilian annexes, becoming a complex peace-building mission, during the early stages 
the military component was the main priority in order to fulfil the cease-fire and the 
demilitarisation. The United states played a central role that actually continued the 
one produced during the negotiations in Dayton to end the war. The transition of the 
international supervision to a self-governed democracy had to be completed in a short 
calendar of nine months after the celebration of first elections. Yet the international 
administration was prolonged successive times because of the lack of progresses in 
key areas of the civilian annexes.
in the prospect of gradual reduction of developing aid, the lack of collaboration 
and obstructionism from the ethno-national parties pushed the international community 
to reinforce its role to reinvigorate peace building and state building. in December 
1997, the HR was thus empowered, becoming the final authority in the country after 
being granted with legislative and executive authority when local representatives did 
not achieve consensus or failed with implementation. With accusations of creating 
a protectorate, one of the most controversies was the right to dismiss local officials 
obstructing the DPA. These extraordinary measures, that could easily undermine the 
process of democratisation inherent to the peace-building mission, were conceived as 
temporary and exceptional.
Although there was will to replace the interventionist period for the empowerment 
of local institutions, the so-called Bonn Powers were increasingly used. Between 1997 
and 1999 the hR carlos Westendorp had an average of four impositions per month, 
while his successor, Wolfgang Petritsch, tripled the number of decisions. Both the 
nature and the evolution of the intervention have been questioned in the literature 
focused on the process of democratisation and peace building in Bosnia (chandler 
1999; KnauS & Martin 2003).
The capacity to legislate of the hR became a central tool for the international 
community to implement the DPA. however, with such capacity the hR began to 
impose laws that had never been either presented to a parliament or discussed with the 
responsible government, i.e. with no consensus with local politicians what complicated 
the subsequent enforcement. if Bonn Powers had proved essential for an early 
development of the constitutional order, laws required institutions to enforce them so 
the imposition was never sufficient per se (ESI 2000). This inefficiency in the powers 
used by the hR was also consequence of the architecture of international intervention 
adopted at Dayton, keeping a sharp separation between the military and the civilian 
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aspects of the intervention while maintaining a very loose coordination among civilian 
agencies, which failed to provide the hR with strong political support. As Belloni 
points out, this model would prove sufficient to preserve the absence of fighting but it 
was inadequate in addressing Bosnia’s stateness problem (Belloni 2007).
The third period of the international agenda started in march 2000 when the 
agenda for EU integration set the path to fulfil the Stabilisation and Association Process 
(sAP) from which the stabilisation and Association Agreement (sAA) is part of it. it 
marked the rise of the European involvement in the country affecting the role of the 
OhR since it was increasingly shaped by EU strategies rather than by Dayton itself. 
The hR became double-headed as EU special Representative and the EU enlargement 
process became a central tool to resolve Bosnia’s main problems (chandler 2005). 
it was not until 2008 when the sAA was signed, which should have opened a new 
phase in the integration process. Yet, for almost seven years it has not been ratified 




The lack of ratification of the SAA since 2008 symbolises the structural difficulties 
to progress in the EU path. Before analysing the political regression produced in the 
country in the last years and the contradictions of the EU intervention in the country, 
it is important to consider the very signature of the sAA in order to highlight the often 
erratic strategy of European institutions in Bosnia, which has undermined its very 
legitimacy. In this sense, in late 2007 for the HR Miroslav Lajčák the progress on EU 
integration was the only way to get Bosnia out of the crisis. he suggested Oli Rehn, 
the European commissioner for Enlargement, to consider acceptable the limited police 
reform to open the way for a stabilisation and Association Agreement with Bosnia, 
despite the latest agreement fell short of complying with European conditionality. 
Thus, the hR’s proposed approach seriously weakened the credibility of the EU in 
Bosnia since it had maintained for several years that any agreement on police reforms 
was needed to comply with the conditions (leroux-Martin 2014). The decision to 
sign the sAA was in detriment of the European conditionality applied to the country as 
not all preconditions defended for years had been met. its signature was used as a tool 
to leverage instead of being a consequence of the very progress of the country.
This lack of reforms had been evident well before the controversial signature of 
the sAA. Bosnia and herzegovina needed a constitutional reform to further progress 
in the EU path since constitution vested powers to the two entities in which the country 
is divided. in order to implement the broad range of measures that the EU requires for 
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the accession, which culminate with the adoption of the acquis communitaire, more 
competences had to be granted to the state. in this context, the so-called April Package 
in 2006 was the first attempt to reform the Constitution following the publication by 
the Venice commission1 in march 2005 of its “Opinion on the constitutional situation 
in Bosnia and herzegovina and the Powers of the high Representative,” known as 
the Venice commission report. in the report it was warned that with the weak state 
structure of Bih the country would not be able to make progress towards the European 
integration. Hence, the subsequent negotiations marked the first time since the DPA 
that Bosnian political leaders discussed about the constitutional reform seriously 
(hayS & croSBy 2006).
After months of negotiations the package of amendments represented consensus 
of five of the seven parties that began the process. Despite all the problematic issues 
pointed by the Venice commission were not eliminated, the agreement represented a 
significant step forward since it supported the development of the state based on party 
lines instead of on entity or ethnic issues (hayS & croSBy 2006). With a majority of two-
thirds required in the parliament the amendment failed only for two votes on 26 April 
2006. As SeBaStián (2010) argues in her analysis of the April Package, the fragmented 
nature of power in Bih, both at inter-ethnic level and within each of ethnic groups, 
undermined the progress of the externally led state-building process. More specifically, 
the politics at the intra-ethnic level acquired a new dimension when the discussion 
entered in the Parliament in the last stage before the voting, which prevented reaching 
the majority required despite the consensus among the main ethno-national parties.
The failure of the April Package was not only a lost opportunity to advance in the 
necessary constitutional reforms in Bosnia to address the EU integration. Actually, as 
a consequence of the disagreement, parties against the package translated the debate 
about the issue of the constitutional reform in the October 2006 elections. it opened 
a period of regression marked by a highly nationalistic rhetoric in which the right 
of the Republika srpska (Rs) to celebrate a referendum emerged in the aftermath of 
the Montengro’s referendum, justified by the alleged desire of Bosniaks to dominate 
the Rs (see MaKSic 2009; toal 2013). This political regression was not halted after 
the elections. in relation to the Rs referendum discourse, it had another peak after 
the declaration of independence in Kosovo in february 2008. furthermore, the 
contestation of state institutions was continuously reproduced afterwards and in may 
2011 catherine Ashton, the high Representative of the Union for foreign Affairs and 
security Policy, visited Banja luka to persuade the president of Republika srpska, 
milorad Dodik, to postpone the organisation of a referendum on Bih’s court and 
prosecutor’s office (SMilJanic 2011).
Another two attempts to reform the constitution were produced after the failure 
of the April Package. The Prud negotiations were held from November 2008 until 
1 With the name of the European commission for Democracy through law, the commission 
is an advisory body of the Council of Europe composed of independent experts in the field of 
constitutional law.
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January 2009 with the participation of the three main political parties (sDA, sNsD 
and HDZ BiH). Parties agreed on fulfilling the five objectives and two conditions 
to close the OhR2, which was seen necessary to move forward with EU accession 
preparation. however, constitutional reform remained blocked, which showed the 
conflicting visions between the main Bosniak, Croat and Serbian parties (perry 
2013). finally, the Butmir conversations were celebrated in late 2009 in a joint EU-
Us initiative to break the long-standing political stalemate in Bih with the focus on 
constitutional reform and the conditions to close the Office of the High Representative. 
Despite Bosnian politicians had agreed that their country’s goal was to join the EU and 
NATO (fENA 2009) and the proposal discussed was weaker than the April package, 
the Butmir Process collapsed after Bih’s major political parties were unable to agree 
upon a platform for reform (perry 2013).
These three attempts can thus be differentiated. The April Package failed 
mainly because of intra-ethnic politics with divisions within the croat and Bosniak 
communities. in the subsequent negotiations, however, the incompatible agendas 
at inter-ethnic level in an environment much more polarised prevented to reach an 
agreement in more basic forms of constitutional reform. Despite having highlighted 
the incapacity to make structural reforms by local actors, the failure in the European 
integration cannot be understood only internally, from the perspective of the lack of 
consensus about the vision of the state among main ethno-national parties.
hence, considering the rise of the European role analysed in the previous section, 
it is important to point out the limits of the Europeisation in Bosnia and herzegovina 
from the point of the international intervention. As JuncoS (2012) argues, the EU’s 
enlargement policy is actually undermined by a series of internal contradictions which 
are worth to focus on: The contradiction
(a) between the EU’s technocratic approach adopted in the enlargement process and 
the politics of state building. Despite the enlargement is an inherently political 
process, the reforms are usually pushed through the basis of efficiency arguments, 
which have not always been accepted by local parties since the promotion of 
specific models of political and economic reorganisation touch upon core 
attributes of state sovereignty.
(b) between state-weakening and state-strengthening dynamics. in this sense, the 
process of central state building aimed at dealing with the membership obligations 
has been parallel to the commission’s recommendation of downsizing the public 
sector in Bosnia.
(c) between the external promotion of reforms and the notion of local ownership. Even 
if EU policies have not imposed in Bosnia due to the reluctance of the commission 
2 The five objectives were: an agreement on state property; an agreement of defense property; 
completion of the Brčko final award; fiscal sustainability; and entrenchment of the rule of law. 
The two conditions were a signed sAA and the Peace implementation council’s (Pic) sign-off 
on full compliance with the Dayton Agreement. 
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to use the Bonn Powers, the intensive intervention in the previous years had 
negative impact on the responsibility of the local authorities. furthermore, EU 
has only been engaged with political elites while the EU integration has been 
perceived as the only viable option, with lack of alternatives.
(d) between EU member state-building policies and the goal of peace building. The 
goal of peace building is the elimination of the root causes of the conflict and the 
creation of the conditions for a sustainable peace while state building is a com- 
ponent of peace building with the focus on the creation and strengthening of 
legitimate state institutions. member-state building has often clashed with peace 
building, being manifested in the problems of promoting reforms based on con-
sensus. The lack of attention to fostering consensus building among ethnic groups 
necessary for a smoothly operation of state institutions has actually contributed 
to slowing down the pace of association and the integration into the EU.
in spite of the years of intervention and having achieved legislative and executive 
authority, international actors have achieved limited progress on the making of a 
functional state in post-war Bosnia. As a consequence, the reforms required to unblock 
the stalemate in the European path have been lowered from the initial constitutional 
reform aimed at preventing the blocking of the needed EU legislation. This process 
of lowering demands is well illustrated with the proposal, which will finally allow 
the ratification of the SAA after the so-called German-British Initiative launched 
in November 2014 by the german foreign minister frank-Walter steinmeier and 
Britain’s Philip hammond.
The constitutional reform was thus replaced as a condition to unblock the 
progress into the European path by a compromise of political forces to commit with the 
future EU perspective. The opened letter signed by the two foreign ministers asked 
the European Union to bring the sAA into force in case that the Bosnian politicians 
committed to a package of reforms closely linked to the compact for growth and Jobs 
that had been published a few months earlier, as response of the protests occurred in 
february 2014. finally, on 23 february 2015, the Parliament adopted a key declaration 
pledging support to the country’s EU accession process, opening the way for Brussels 
to activate Bosnia’s stabilisation and Association Agreement (JuKic 2015).
4 Conclusions
The peace building and state building in post-war Bosnia have been complex 
processes with limited outcomes considering the personal and material resources 
invested in the country. The need to develop the civilian annexes of the DPA, quite 
ambiguous compared to the military provisions, and the role of ethno-national parties 
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during the post-war period with diverse if not opposite agendas have posed major 
barriers in the development of a functioning state. in a parallel way, the policies set 
by the international actors have often produced unintended outcomes due to the poor 
adaptation to the needs and complexity of Bosnia and herzegovina, and even a lack of 
comprehension of the reality on the ground.
in the last few weeks a new road map proposed by foreign ministers of germany 
and Britain has been brought to unblock the ratification of the SAA. It has been 
consequence of a new formula, which aims at producing the reforms in the following 
years after the compromise of the political parties. The new road map has been endorsed 
by the Parliament as these lines are being written. We will have to see whether or not 
it will generate any changes in both the poor implementation and the lack of consensus 
among main political parties characteristic of the post-war period. What is clear is 
that after several unsuccessful attempts to produce a significant constitutional reform 
needed to face the challenges of the European integration, lowering the requirements 
to resume the European path might only produce an illusion of progress as the one 
generated after the signature of the sAA in 2008.
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